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BOOK REVIEWS 
ENRAGED OVER PUNISHMENT: ONE 
JUDGE'S CALL FOR SENTENCING 
REFORM 
THOMAS R. BURTON, III* 
A RAGE TO PUNISH, By LOIS G. FORER. New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company. 1994. Pp. 204. 
I will never forget the fear the new principal of Poquonock Ele-
mentary School impressed upon me the first day of fourth grade. He 
sternly told the student body that the policy for disobeying our teachers 
would be "three strikes and you're out!" We were too fearful to ask 
what we would be out of, but his mandate sure kept the fourth grade 
in line. Years later, the policy that governed my elementary school 
conduct has swept through popular political opinion with Presidential 
hopefuls Bob Dole and Phil Gramm preaching "three strikes and 
you're out" regarding lifetime sentences for repeat criminal offenders.! 
In fact, the vast majority of Americans support the death penalty, and 
some even believe that the rattan cane is proper punishment for minor 
crimes.2 However, Lois G. Forer, author of A Rage to Punish, assaults 
the reader from the opposite end of the sentencing spectrum with a 
critique of mandatory sentencing laws that contravenes popular opin-
ion and my former principal.3 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 Nkechi Taifa, "Three Strikes-and-You're Out"-Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third Time 
Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 717, 718 (1995) (for discussion history, current status and flaws of 
"three strikes and you're out" legislation); see Kathleen Kahn, The Crime of Cracking Down, SAN 
FRAN. CHRONICLE, Aug. 14, 1994, at Sunday Review 8; David Bauman, Whitman Says National 
Must Fine-Tune failing of Juveniles, Adults, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, July 19, 1995, 1995 WL 
2901724 at 1, 2 (In June of 1995 New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman signed into law 
a three strikes policy); see also Stephen Chapman, Criminal Behavior in the Drug War, Toughness 
Has Become Stupidity, CHI. TRIB., February 9, 1995, at 27. 
2 Yale Kamisar, For This Judge, Prison was the Punishment of Last Resort, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., 
July 19, 1994, at 2. 
3 LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH (1994). 
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Forer grounds her critique on sixteen years of experience as a 
judge in Philadelphia's trial court of generaljurisdiction.4 Her experi-
ence demonstrated the woeful inadequacies inherent in the present 
system of mandatory sentencing. In fact, an experience with manda-
tory sentencing drove her to resign from the bench. Forer faced a 
defendant who, in an act of desperation after losing all sources of 
income, robbed a cab driver of fifty dollars at toy pistol-point.5 Mitigat-
ing factors, such as the fact that the defendant was married with a child 
and the robbery was his first offense, convinced Forer to sentence the 
man to a short prison sentence, a long probation, and repayment of 
the fifty dollars.6 Even the victim agreed with the sentence.7 However, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that under the state mandatory 
sentencing statute, the first time offender must serve five years in 
prison.s Forer describes her reason for leaving after the ruling: "Faced 
with the choice of violating a court order or imposing a sentence that 
I believed was contrary to long-established principles of justice and 
fairness, I left the bench."9 
Through her sixteen years on the bench, Forer developed her own 
sentencing system radically different than the mandatory sentencing 
laws implemented in the last twelve years. 10 Forer states that our present 
sentencing system is rooted in punishing the individual, whereas she 
advocates a sentencing philosophy fueled by public safety concerns. ll 
She believes that we are motivated by a rage to punish. The rage to 
punish grows from the religious philosophy that crime is sin. Com-
bined with the tenet that all people have free will, the result is that 
those who commit crimes voluntarily sin; thus, they must be punished 
as sinners.12 The rage to punish is so pervasive that people who pose 
4Id. at 1-2. 
5 [d. at 2-4. 
6 [d. at 3. 
7Id. 
SId. 
9Id. at 4. 
10 See Kristen K. Sauer, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury about Mandatory Sentencing 
Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1235 (1995);Julia L. Black, The Constitutionality of Federal 
Sentences Imposed Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 After Mistretta v. United States, 75 IOWA 
L. REv. 767, 769 (1990) (In 1984 Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act in an attempt to 
set up a fairer and more determinate sentencing system). 
II FORER, supra note 3, at 122; see generally ABE FORTAS, DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 
32 (1968) (for the proposition that punishment must be meted out). 
12 FORER, supra note 3, at 28. 
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no threat to the public are frequently jailed, prisons are overcrowded, 
and the taxpayer spends more money supporting convicts than edu-
cating the nation's youth.13 Due to staggering prison overcrowding, the 
need for reform clearly exists, and without suggestions for change, our 
flawed system will simply perpetuate itself.14 
Lois Forer offers a refreshing view that advocates sweeping change 
in sentencing laws. She rejects the ')ust deserts" theory, and instead, 
promotes a theory based on rehabilitation.15 Her sentencing theory 
embraces safety for the public, probation for the non-dangerous crimi-
nal, and reparations to the victims. 16 In addition to the shift from 
punitive sentencing to rehabilitative sentencing, the second major 
distinction between mandatory sentencing laws and Forer's theory is 
that under Forer's theory the judge maintains discretion to choose an 
appropriate sentence.17 Before examining whether Forer's theory pre-
sents a realistic solution to problems created by mandatory sentencing, 
the history of mandatory sentencing laws is appropriate. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) in 1984.18 The 
intent of the SRA was to create fairer and more determinate sentencing 
than the former system which was based on rehabilitation theories. 19 
Along with the goal of reducing sentencing disparities created by 
judicial discretion, the four major purposes of the SRA were: 1. respect 
for the law and just punishment, 2. adequate deterrence, 3. protection 
from further crimes by the defendant, 4. rehabilitation.2o Since 1984, 
Congress has passed mandatory minimum sentences for serious crimes 
and drug offenses.21 In fact, at the federal level, all crimes are now 
131d. at 7. 
14 Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 413, 415 (1992). 
15 FORER, supra note 3, at 122-23. Calls for rehabilitation are making a comeback as prison 
wardens across the nation call for repeal of mandatory minimums and the expansion of rehabili-
tation programs in prisons. New Simon Survey Shows Wardens Dispute Politicians' Answer.s on Crime, 
Prison Policy, u.s. NEWS AND WORLD REpORT, Dec. 21, 1994, 1994 WL 11129227 at 2-3. 
16 FORER, supra note 3, at 122-23. 
171d. at 64. 
18 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 992-996 (1993); 
Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion 
of Sentencers, 101 YALE LJ. 1681, 1685 (1992). 
19 Black, supra note 10, at 769; see Freed, supra note 18, at 1689. 
2°18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (1988). 
21 Miller, supra note 14, at 433. 
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punishable by mandatory sentences, mandatory minimum penalties, 
or narrowly guided sentencing ranges.22 States followed suit by enacting 
mandatory minimums that resulted in prison overcrowding.23 These 
mandatory minimums adhere to the same goals of the SRA.24 However, 
goals such as just deserts fall under Forer's scrutiny.25 
II. JUST DESERTS UNDER MANDATORY SENTENCING VERSUS 
FORER'S REHABILITATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Current sentencing policy reflects a preference for retributive 
justice; the theory that one should get his '~ust deserts" for the crime 
committed is at the heart of mandatory sentencing.26 Marc Miller writes 
that reformers of the old system criticized indeterminate sentencing 
systems and, "offered in its place some version of just deserts as the pri-
mary organizing principle for sentencing."27 The '~ust deserts" model 
emerged because rehabilitation failed as a criminal sentencing guide.28 
William Selke argues that the writings of scholars and highly respected 
criminologists fueled a national movement away from the rehabilitative 
sentencing theory.29 These writings indicated that rehabilitation failed, 
and that rehabilitation theory results in lenient sentences.30 
However, the '~ust deserts" theory contains flaws which warrant a 
shift back toward the rehabilitative sentencing theory that Forer advo-
cates. First, '~ust deserts" is too much the product of political and 
popular opinion, rather than of principle.31 Selke maintains that crime 
22 Sauer, supra note 10, at 1235. 
23 Id.; Miller, supra note 14, at 415. 
24 Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission, 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 185, 192 (1993). 
25 FORER, supra note 3. 
26 Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate 
Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 63 (1993) (current sentencing policy reflects preference 
for retributive justice, with punishment commensurate with the seriousness of each type of 
offense). 
27 Miller, supra note 14, at 43l. 
28 Id.; WILLEM DE HAAN, THE POLITICS OF REDRESS: CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND PENAL ABo-
LITION 5--6 (1990) (Intellectuals for law and order have advocated a 'new realist' criminology 
which dictates that rehabilitation of offenders does not work, and that punishment by imprison-
ment is what will effectively reduce crime); see Michael Tonry, Sentencing Reforms and Racial 
Disparities, 78JUDICATURE 118, 119 (Nov.-Dec. 1994) ('just deserts" filled rationale for sentencing 
in absence of rehabilitation theories). 
29 WILLIAM L. SELKE, PRISONS IN CRISIS 24-25 (1993). 
30 Id. 
31 Miller, supra note 14, at 414; see Lowenthal, supra note 26, at 123 (severity of mandatory 
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control is a very safe topic for the politician to emphasize, and that the 
solutions the politician presents seem cheap and easy.32 Due to wide-
spread agreement that to control crime there must be more imprison-
ment and death penalty statutes, the politician simply feeds into popu-
lar opinion, rather than searching for effective alternatives.33 
Second, mandatory sentencing geared toward punishing the of-
fender results in prison overcrowding; thus, the costs of maintaining 
prisons and their inmates spiral upward without restraint.34 Gary Lowen-
thal gives three reasons why mandatory sentencing contributes to prison 
overcrowding: 
First, elimination of trial court discretion .. .increases the per-
centage of arrested offenders who are sentenced to prison. 
Second, the average sentence imposed in court for persons 
imprisoned with mandatory enhancements is much longer 
than the average sentence for offenders sent to prison with-
out them. Third, even when courtroom sentences are equal, 
the actual period of confinement for persons sentenced with 
mandatory enhancements is normally longer .... "35 
As a result, the United States has by far the world's highest known 
rate of incarceration, with over one and a half million prisoners.36 
The total cost of incarcerating Americans in prison was 20 billion 
dollars in fiscal year 1994.37 
A third criticism of the 'just deserts" mandatory sentencing policy 
is that it fails to prevent future crimes by potential offenders.38 The 
reason why mandatory minimums do not prevent crime by those peo-
ple not incarcerated is that people, when committing a crime, simply 
do not think through the consequences of that crime. Selke, in exam-
punishment presents difficult political issue, what legislator wants to appear soft on crime by 
decreasing penalties for offenses involving violence, drugs); Kahn, supra note 1; cf Bauman, supra 
note 1, at 1 (New Jersey Governor Whitman dismissed politically popular trend to jump on get 
tough on crime bandwagon). 
32 SELKE, supra note 29, at 117. 
33 See id.; Sauer, supra note 10, at 1236. 
34 Lowenthal, supra note 26, at 72. 
35Id. 
36 Richard Lacayo, The Real Hard Cell, TIME, Sept. 4, 1995, at 31. Furthermore, prison 
populations have doubled in the last ten years. Id. 
37Id. at 31. 
38 FORER, supra note 3, at 71-72. In Pennsylvania between 1985 and 1990 crime increased by 
6 percent, but the prison population increased by 171 percent. Id. Severity of punishment has 
not reduced crime, but it has increased the prison population. Id. 
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ining Nordic Criminology, notes that crime is significantly affected by 
social and economic factors, such as the labor market and health, 
education, and welfare policies.39 For people who are socially and 
economically disadvantaged, prison is no worse than their present 
situation.4o These people are not likely to consider the consequences 
of their actions. Thus, without the consequences considered, manda-
tory minimums cannot deter crime.41 
Forer's alternative theory, based generally on rehabilitation of the 
offender, seems to offer a compelling answer to the ills of mandatory 
sentencing. The strongest argument in favor of her philosophy is that 
it worked in her courtroom.42 She strove to rehabilitate non-dangerous 
criminals by paroling them upon the condition that they participate 
in programs for the purpose of rehabilitation.43 Furthermore, she or-
dered reparations to compensate the victims of crime.44 The results 
were compelling: less than twenty percent of the criminals she sen-
tenced to probation and reparations were rearrested; thus, her method 
rehabilitated criminals.45 Moreover, crime was deterred more effec-
tively than under the 'just deserts" theory because, among those peo-
ple she sentenced to probation and reparations, significantly less commit-
ted additional crime. Finally, her theory alleviates prison overcrowding 
because only people dangerous to public safety are sentenced to prison 
terms. The use of prison as a last resort protects the public while also 
reducing overcrowding.46 
The success of Forer's sentencing philosophy in other courtrooms 
is further evidence of its applicability.47 For example, Judge Noonan of 
the Ninth Circuit maintains alternative sanctions may be sufficient 
even though they depart from the guidelines. In writing about United 
States v. Takai,48 where a first time offender attempted to secure a green 
card by bribing an immigration official, the judge stated: "the sentence 
39 SELKE, supra note 29, at 48. 
40 See id. 
41 See FORER, supra note 3, at 63. 
42 See id. at 123-24. 
43 See id. at 133-34. 
44 See id. at 124. 
45Id. Among the inventive rehabilitation programs Forer advocates is "Choice." Choice 
supervises young people in their homes, not institutions, and the rate of re-arrest for youth in 
this program is much less than others with similar backgrounds who do not participate in the 
program. FORER, supra note 3, at 160. 
46 See FORER, supra note 3, at 124. 
47 Miller, supra note 14, at 460--61. 
48 930 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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actually imposed was salutatory and sharp, involving substantial fines, 
a period of confinement at home and a substantial period of probation. "49 
However, Forer's sentencing philosophy is not without serious 
criticism. First, her rehabilitative theory using probation and repara-
tions is not novel. The rehabilitation theory was in vogue during the 
1960s and 1970s.50 Under this theory, the criminal justice system per-
ceived crime as indicative of some underlying problem in the of-
fender.51 The justice system's ultimate objective was to diagnose the 
problem, whether it be biological, genetic, or social, and develop an 
appropriate strategy. 52 Furthermore, probation as a system has im-
proved over the last twenty years, and it has been used as a method to 
attempt the rehabilitation of offenders. 53 In addition, rehabilitative 
theory using prisons as a last resort has been the focal point of Scan-
dinavian Criminology for many years. 54 
The most damning critique of Forer's rehabilitative approach is 
that by 1984, when the Sentencing Reform Act was passed, the criminal 
justice system's goal of rehabilitating offenders had failed.55 The chief 
reason why Congress passed sentencing reform, which incorporated 
mandatory sentences under a 'just deserts" theory, was because Con-
gress believed that rehabilitation theories failed.56 It seems that while 
Forer's rehabilitative approach may have experienced success within 
the microenvironment of her courtroom, rehabilitation theory simply 
fails on a nationwide scale. 
Within Forer's rehabilitation construct, implementing reparation 
payments presents practical problems. First, what if the criminal can-
not pay restitution? Forer never answers that question for the reader. 57 
Furthermore, she never addresses the problem of whether the victim 
could sue the offender in civil court for damages once the victim 
receives reparations from the criminal court. What if the victim be-
lieved he or she was undercompensated? Must the victim settle for what 
49 Miller, supra note 14, at 46I. 
50 Steve Wilson, Do We Punish Criminals for Deterrence, Justice or Revenge?, THE ARIZ. REpUB-
LIC, July 16, 1995, at A2. 
51 SELKE, supra note 29, at II. 
52Id. 
53Id. at 13I. 
54 See id. at 49. 
55 See Miller, supra note 14, at 435. 
56Id. 
57 See FORER, supra note 3, at 134 (while she never answers the question, she does indicate 
that she required offenders to find ajob and pay reparations over time from their salary). 
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Forer thought was proper? Shouldn't the victim have the option be-
tween judge or jury when seeking reparations? 
Forer's position that prison be reserved for only violent offenders 
is not without support. Selke argues that clearly the public is not 
threatened by a non-violent offender.58 Moreover, by keeping non-vio-
lent offenders out of prison, they will be less likely to threaten society, 
because they will not be influenced by contact with violent offenders.59 
Moreover, limiting prison to violent offenders eases overcrowding and 
saves money, while stimulating alternative methods of correction.60 
Finally, Scandinavian countries such as Denmark have successfully im-
plemented justice systems that minimize crimes for which incarcera-
tion is warranted, and they have increased alternatives to the prison 
sanction.61 
Yale Kamisar offers the most practical criticism of the public safety 
aspect to Forer's sentencing theory. Kamisar argues that even if prison 
sentencing philosophy shifts to public safety, judges will likely lock up 
as many criminals because they are "dangerous" as under the current 
retributive system.62 The line between crime that threatens public safety 
and crime that does not is unclear. Furthermore, many people would 
rather see non-violent criminals imprisoned in order to prevent the 
criminal from repeating the crime, at least for the criminal's jail term. 
For example, while car theft may not threaten public safety, its incon-
venience causes the justice system to imprison car thieves. At the very 
least, this incarceration prevents a particular thief from stealing an-
other car for the period of his jail term. 
Second, Forer's public safety theory, while sensible to reduce prison 
overcrowding, is inconsistent with her goal of rehabilitation. By sen-
tencing violent offenders to prison, Forer concedes that these offend-
ers cannot be rehabilitated. Because they are jailed, they will not 
benefit from a system of probation and reparations designed to address 
the criminal's social or psychological problems. Thus, Forer's sentenc-
ing theory is inconsistent. 
While Forer's sentencing theory alleviates many of the problems 
created by a 'just deserts" mandatory sentencing regime, in order for 
her theory to be truly successful, it must make the transition from a 
micro, single courtroom scale, to a macro, national scale. However, past 
58 SELKE, supra note 29, at 122. 
59Id. 
60Id. 
61Id. at llO-II. 
62 Kamisar, supra note 2. 
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national practice indicates that rehabilitation theory failed. Perhaps 
the best way to implement rehabilitation theory is outside of the crimi-
nal justice system. Scandinavian countries, such as Denmark, aban-
doned rehabilitation goals within their criminal justice system.53 Instead, 
they incorporate rehabilitation methods into social and economic re-
form outside of the criminal justice system. 54 Whether or not rehabili-
tation theories can be implemented outside of our criminal justice 
system is unclear. This is because American society allows for greater 
social and economic disparities among classes in the name of individ-
ual freedom, whereas Scandinavian society stresses greater social and 
economic equality that de-emphasizes materialistic goals.55 
III. THE QUESTION OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
Forer's sentencing theory advocates a return to judicial discretion 
in sentencing offenders. However, mandatory sentencing laws were 
passed in part because indeterminate sentencing policies resulted in 
so much judicial discretion that similarly situated criminals received 
vastly different sentences.55 For instance, Daniel Freed comments on 
the inequitable nature of judicial discretion: 
[S] ome judges began at the bottom of the statutory range and 
adjusted sentences upward .... Other judges started at the top, 
on the theory that every convicted offender earned the maxi-
mum penalty ... , subject to mitigating circumstances .... Still 
others began at midrange, or at some other intermediate 
point, working up or down, as aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances surfaced.57 
Inconsistent sentencing and a lack of guidelines concerning the 
effect of mitigating factors prompted Congress to institute manda-
tory guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences. 58 
63 SELKE, supra note 29, at 49. 
64Id. at 49-50. 
65 See SELKE, supra note 29, at 48. Selke includes comment from Kyvsgaard who argues 
fundamental societal differences between the United States and Scandinavia contribute to crimi-
nology differences. See id. Scandinavian countries can implement rehabilitation theories into 
their social reform, because they believe in social and economic equality as a means to reduce 
crime. See id. Whereas in America, individual freedom fails to stress social equality, reform cannot 
succeed on a social level because economic equality is undervalued. See id. 
66 Black, supra note 10, at 769. 
67 Freed, supra note 18, at 1688. 
68 See Hatch, supra note 24, at 187. 
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The second major argument against Forer's position is that judi-
cial discretion results in a greater disparity in sentencing between 
whites and blacks.69 Studies done by the United States Sentencing 
Commission indicate that black drug defendants receive substantially 
longer average prison terms than whites who commit comparable 
crimes.70 Thus, affording judicial discretion may result in racist sen-
tencing practices. 
However, mandatory minimums are subject to the same criticisms 
as indeterminate sentencing. First, mandatory sentencing lacks the 
uniformity it sought to achieve; thus, its practices are also inconsis-
tent. 71 This type of sentencing issues blanket sentences without regard 
for the person in the courtroom.72 While on its face this seems consis-
tent, on application it is inconsistent because it does not account for 
the mitigating factors that judges in the past utilized in order to fairly 
mete out sanctions.73 Miller argues that the specific facts of each case 
need to be addressed on an ad hoc basis to ensure fairness: 
The "nature and circumstances of the offense and the his-
tory and characteristics of the [offender]" determine the 
offender's culpability, blameworthiness, potential to cause ad-
ditional harm, and capacity for rehabilitation .... [C]ontex-
tual information concerning whether the offense is increasing 
in frequency, public concern in a particular locale, and whether 
punishing the defendant will cause special harm to others, 
such as family or employees, may be relevant to sentencing.74 
fi9 Stuart Taylor, Jr., How a Racist Drug War Swells Crime, LEGAL TiMES, Feb. 22, 1993, at 35. 
70Id. 
71 "Ad hoc decision making and lack of uniformity inevitably lead to sentence disparities, 
regardless of who makes the decisions; prosecutors, no less than judges, are susceptible to 
arbitrariness when exercising unguided discretion .... The most troubling aspect of this disparity 
is that sentences are based partially on whether defendants exercise their constitutional right to 
trial." Lowenthal, supra note 26, at 108. 
72 See Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps Backward, 78 
JUDICATURE 169, 170 (Jan.-Feb. 1995); Hatch, supra note 24, at 194. 
73 "Mandatory sentencing laws inherently result in unwarranted disparities ... [because there 
is no] regard to the total mix of aggravating and mitigating circumstances present in individual 
cases." Lowenthal, supra note 26, at 66. It is also argued that mandatory minimums place too 
much control over sentencing in the hands of legislatures. Sauer, supra note 10, at 1240. Man-
datory minimums are generally enacted as passionate political responses to a few highly publi-
cized offenses or a perceived generalized frustration with crime. Id. at 1240--41. The result is a 
"majoritarian oppression where the just punishment of some comes only at the expense of the 
unjust punishment of others." Id. 
74 Miller, supra note 14, at 464. 
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Thus, while mandatory sentencing seeks consistency with blanket 
sentences, it is equally unfair because it fails to account for sig-
nificant mitigating factors. Because neither full discretion nor man-
datory minimums reduce the inconsistencies in prison sentencing, 
many reformers are calling for compromise based in mandatory 
sentencing, but which authorizes courts to depart from them when 
substantial and compelling mitigating circumstances exist.75 
Second, while full judicial discretion is criticized as racist, the 
mandatory minimums may also be subject to the same criticism.76 A 
study done by the United States Sentencing Commission indicates 
substantial unevenness in the imposition of federal mandatory mini-
mum sentences.77 Over two thirds of eligible black defendants received 
sentences at or above mandatory minimum levels, while only fifty-four 
percent of eligible whites received similar sentences.78 Jerome Miller, 
president of the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, writes, 
"our overcrowded prisons are less a result of rising crime, than a 
consequence of strategies which have focused increasingly punitive 
measures primarily on inner-city blacks. "79 This data suggests that man-
datory sentencing in practice is inconsistent, disparate punishment.8o 
Third, by eliminating judicial discretion, mandatory sentencing 
severs a significant safety valve inherent in the adversary system, the 
Sixth Amendment right to a fair triaPl Senator Orrin Hatch embodies 
the problem as follows: "Perhaps the most serious criticism of the 
guidelines is that their compulsory nature has given prosecutors too 
much leverage over defendants thereby elbowing judges out of the 
sentencing process."82 The prosecutor possesses enormous plea bar-
gaining leverage because a much stiffer sentence awaits the defendant 
75 See Hatch, supra note 24, at 196; Lowenthal, supra note 26, at 66. 
76FoRER, supra note 3, at 151. Following mandatory drug crime laws between 1986-91 
minority adults arrested for drug crimes rose by 57 percent, whereas non-minority arrests rose 
by 6 percent. While one third of all persons arrested were minorities, they make up half of the 
prison population. Laws intended to be neutral in effect are not. See id.; see also Tonry, supra 
note 28, at U8 (Minority Americans are especially susceptible to prosecution under mandatory 
minimums). 
77 Lowenthal, supra note 26, at 109. 
78Id. at 109-10. 
79 Taylor, supra note 69. 
80 See id.; Hatch, supra note 24, at 193 (current lack of uniform application may be dramati-
cally undermining sentencing certainty). 
81 Russell C. Gabriel, A Rage To Punish, N.Y. TIMES, August 21, 1994, § 7 (letter to the Editor), 
at 35. 
82 Hatch, supra note 24, at 191. Mandatory minimums employ a relatively narrow approach 
under which the same sentence may be mandated for widely divergent cases. Id. at 194. 
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than in the past, and the likelihood of parole is either diminished or 
denied.83 The number of trials decrease because defendants are less 
willing to chance a long prison term regardless of their innocence.84 
The process eliminates the judge, and the defendant loses the consti-
tutional protection owed to him.85 Thus, more defendants go to prison 
because of new-found prosecutorial power.86 Lowenthal argues that 
because of the risk of long prison terms, mandatory minimums cast 
doubt as to whether the defendant is given his Sixth Amendment 
guaran tee to a fair trial. 87 
Finally, enormous prosecutorial plea bargaining power contrib-
utes significantly to prison overcrowding and spiralling prison costS.88 
Reformers maintain that in order to combat this problem, Congress 
should compromise mandatory minimums and enact laws that return 
a greater degree of flexibility to the judiciary. 89 This solution will ensure 
greater opportunity for trial, and reduce prison overcrowding and 
maintenance costs. 
While it is true that both mandatory minimums and indetermi-
nate sentencing practices contain elements of unfairness and racism, 
when forced to choose between two imperfect systems, the system that 
retains the most judicial discretion is preferable.90 The most significant 
flaw in mandatory sentencing is the fact that it may violate the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. The right to a fair trial is 
fundamental to the American criminal justice system. Despite its flaws, 
allowing judicial discretion in the sentencing process protects the de-
fendant's constitutional rights. Thus, a sentencing process that imple-
mentsjudicial discretion is the better system, because it protects against 
the greatest inequity: failure to receive a fair trial. 
While A Rage to Punish offers novel alternative theories to our 
present sentencing system, research mistakes cut deeply into the credi-
bility of Forer's theories.91 Yale Kamisar notes that Forer's interpreta-
83 See FORER, supra note 3, at 64; Lowenthal, supra note 26, at 72. 
84 See Lowenthal, supra note 26, at 80. 
85 See Sauer, supra note 10, at 1240 (mandatory penalties virtually eliminate judicial discretion 
at sentencing); Tonry, supra note 72; Gabriel, supra note 81. 
86 See Lowenthal, supra note 26, at 85. 
87Id. at 85-86 (when the risk of going to trial is so great that defendants are rarely willing 
to risk a trial, the values the sixth amendment seeks to protect are undermined). 
88Id. at 85. 
89Hatch, supra note 24, at 196. 
90 Tonry, supra note 28. 
91 Kamisar, supra note 2. 
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tion that Furman v. Georgia declared the death penalty unconstitu-
tional is erroneous.92 Kamisar writes that Furman held that the state's 
death penalty under its present arbitrary system constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment, but the constitutionality question of the death 
penalty in general was left open.93 Furthermore, Forer states that the 
Warren court handed down Furman, when in actuality it was the Bur-
ger court.94 Forer also indicates that the death penalty was restored by 
the Supreme Court in 1976.95 As a result, "36 states enacted new death 
penalty laws. "96 However, Kamisar indicates that the Burger court did 
not lead the way in reviving the death penalty, thirty-six states had 
already instituted the death penalty prior to Gregg v. Georgia.97 
IV. CONCLUSION 
But for the philosophy of punishing the criminal, mandatory 
sentencing may not be a rational choice for the criminal justice system. 
Mandatory sentencing contributes to prison overcrowding, exorbitant 
prison costs, and inconsistencies in the sentencing process which fur-
ther racial discrimination and possibly infringe upon the defendant's 
Sixth Amendment rights. Lois Forer presents the most radical solutions 
to today's sentencing predicaments. While other commentators realize 
the inherent difficulties in reforming the politically driven system, and 
they couch their recommendations on compromise between the judi-
ciary and the legislative branch, Forer advocates a complete return to 
judicial power. Her theory dispels the notion of punishing the of-
fender, and it incorporates the notions of public safety, reparations to 
the victims, and rehabilitation of the offender. Forer's ideas are not 
new; rehabilitation was the norm in the 1970s and is presently prac-
ticed in Scandinavian countries. Nor are they lacking in flaws; statistics 
indicate full judicial discretion in sentencing may be racist. However, 
her theories cause the reader to pause and scrutinize the worthiness 
Y2Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
93Kamisar, supra note 2. "[The] majority held that [carrying out the death penalty under] 
the then arbitrarily and randomly administered system constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The pivotal opinions of Justices Potter Stewart and Byron White left open the question of 
whether any system of capital punishment, as opposed to the capriciously administered one before 
the court. would be unconstitutional." Id. 
94Id. 
95 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
96 FORER, supra note 3, at 101. 
97 Kamisar, supra note 2. 
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of mandatory sentencing laws. While my fourth grade principal may 
have had the right theory for elementary school justice, the intricacies 
of today's justice system demand much greater care than "three strikes 
and you're out." Like a screaming line drive hit at the reader, A Rage 
to Punish surely does not strike out, rather, it forces us to react to 
serious problems inherent in today's criminal justice system. 
